Price eciency plays an important role in nancial markets. Firms inuence it, particularly when they issue public equity. They can hire a reputable underwriter with a star analyst to generate public signals about prots to reduce uncertainty and increase valuations. We develop an assignment model of this labor market. The value of a match between rms, that dier in multiple dimensions, and agents, that dier in precision, is endogenously generated from a stock-market equilibrium. We characterize the multidimensional-to-one assignment and obtain testable predictions. Extensions allow rms to value eciency for other reasons and apply to other labor markets like media-or-investor relations professionals.
1.

Introduction
The information eciency of stock prices (Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) ) plays an important role in many aspects of nancial economics. It determines the cost of capital when a rm goes public (Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) ), shapes agency and incentive problems in the rm (Holmström and Tirole (1993) ) and inuences the level of capital investments (Chen et al. (2007) , Bai et al. (2013) )). In practice, rms can aect the level of information eciency, particularly when they issue public equity. During this time, a rm can hire a reputable underwriter (typically an investment bank) with a talented analyst to generate public signals about rm prots, thereby reducing uncertainty and increasing valuations. Empirically, a rm's hiring decision is heavily inuenced by the presence of such analysts (often called an "All-American"), who typically work for reputable underwriters (Krigman et al. (2001) , Hong and Kubik (2003) ). Firms pay for this accurate coverage through both underwriting fees and underpricing (Cli and Denis (2004) ). Consistent with rms competing and spending signicant resources for quality coverage, there is signicant analyst wage dispersion. The most accurate and inuential analysts earn millions of dollars a year in renumeration covering initial public oerings (see, e.g., Stickel (1992) ).
Despite the importance of coverage in determining the informational eciency of rms in need of public capital, there has been little theoretical research on this labor market. As such, we provide an assignment model, where coverage is endogenously determined by the labor market matching of rms with agents who can generate coverage, dened as a public signal about the rm's fundamental pay-o. 2 The agents have heterogeneous precision (indexed 1 A large body of evidence points to the ability of this coverage to improve informational eciency and mean stock prices. Analyst coverage in the cross-section is correlated with more informative prices and deeper markets (see, e.g., Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) ). Exogenous shocks to analyst coverage generated by brokerage house mergers (Hong and Kacperczyk (2010) ) or closures (Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012) ) show that the eect of coverage on price eciency is causal. Media coverage variation due to dierential investor access to local newspapers or newspaper strikes lead to similar causal conclusions for the benets of coverage for stock market pricing (Engelberg and Parsons (2011) and Peress (2014) ).
2 A typical starting point for thinking about assignment problems with heterogeneous agents is the model of Becker (1973) and Rosen (1974) . Building on this, there are extensive works that study labor market sorting.
by h), which is known to the market. 3 Given that the best analysts typically work at the best underwriters and their tasks of coverage and obtaining high equity valuations for their client rm are one and the same, our model can be thought of as applying to an underwriter where the heterogeneity is the informational precision of the coverage.
Consistent with practice, rms hire at most one agent (an underwriter/analyst pair) to generate coverage when they issue equity. We only allow the agent to work for one rm for simplicity. 4 The outcome of the labor market matching between rms and agents determines the accuracy or precision of coverage across rms, i.e. the endogenous informational eciency in the stock market. We assume rms can dier potentially over a number of dierent dimensions, including investment scale, amount of share issuance, risk-absorption capacity of the rm's investors, cashow volatility, and its informational environment before the purchase of coverage.
Empirical work points to the importance of assortative matching in the initial or secondary public oering stages between rms and underwriters (Fernando et al. (2005) , Akkus et al. (2013) ). Our paper provides a theory for this empirical work. In particular, our analysis emphasizes the importance of sorting on multiple rm dimensions and we derive the complementarity endogenously from the rm's stock pricing and trading environment. That is, the noisy rational expectations equilibrium of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) tells us the value of the match to an agent of a given precision depending on multiple rm dimensions.
Our model extends earlier matching models used in the rm-CEO matching literature (see, e.g., Terviö (2008) ; Gabaix and Landier (2008) ), where complementarities are exogenously specied in the rm's production function.
There are three dates. At t = 0, a rm issuing equity and seeking to maximize its share price decides which agent it will hire, i.e. the assignment function µ(y) a rm of characteristic y, where y can denote potentially dierent rm characteristics, to an agent of precision h.
Firms pay a competitive wage to hire an agent. Each agent works for and covers one rm, producing the information for that rm at a xed cost.
At t = 1, asset markets are open for each rm. The asset market follows a traditional noisy rational expectations set-up. Investors submit price-contingent demand based on their own private signals and whatever public signal the rm purchases in the labor market for coverage. 5 There are also noise traders in the market. At t = 2, the pay-o of the rm is realized. Following the literature (see, e.g., Merton (1987) ), asset markets are segmented. 6 We solve for an equilibrium consisting of: (1) optimality of rm coverage decisions; (2) optimality of investor's decisions; (3) market clearing in the labor market, i.e. an assignment function µ(y) and wage function ω(h) based on the optimal choices of the rms for coverage and the talent distribution of agents; and (4) market-clearing in the asset markets.
In equilibrium, coverage improves the estimation of fundamentals by investors, i.e. the market is more ecient. Since idiosyncratic risk is priced, this also means a higher stock price for the company at t = 1. 7 In other words, coverage improves both price eciency and the mean price, consistent with empirical evidence on the importance of coverage for the pricing of the stock market.
Our model generates several sets of results. First, we derive the multi-dimensional-to-one matching of rm characteristics of talent. We show that the many rm characteristics that determine the value of a match can be collapsed into two dimensions. The rst is scale variables, including the size of the share issuance and the risk absorption capacity of the rm, that lead to a higher risk premium. The second is transparency variables, including 5 We consider an asset market along the line of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) ; Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) . Specically, our setup is closet to the one in Hellwig et al. (2006) . 6 We use segmentation for convenience. We show that our results obtain as along as asset markets are incomplete and the idiosyncratic risk of a rm is priced as a result.
7 However, we have not modeled the potential bias in coverage as a result of conicts of interest or incentive issues (see, e.g., Michaely and Womack (1999) , Hong and Kubik (2003) , Dyck and Zingales (2003) ). One could introduce bias into our setting by assuming the noise traders are inuenced by the bias. But assuming that there is talent in spinning the news to get stock prices higher, we would end up with the same outcome in terms of valuations but through an alternative channel to information eciency. But information eciency is, nonetheless, the most natural route to model this eect and the data also points to information eciency eects as well as mean price eects of coverage. the rm's cash-ow precision, the precision of private signals and the degree of noise trading, which lead to a lower risk premium.
Holding xed scale, we show that there is positive assortative matching using an index of the rm's information environment that adds up the transparency variables. This result follows from a closed-form characterization of the matching surplus function between the rms and the agents. It holds for any distribution of precision among agents and distribution of rm characteristics. Firms with a higher opacity have more risk that investors have to bear and hence pay more for accurate coverage. Holding xed opacity, rms with a higher scale have more risk that the investors have to bear. Hence, higher scale rms benet the most from paying for the most precise agents.
Under regularity conditions from Chiappori et al. (2016) , we can characterize the assignment equilibrium that maps (assigns) these two dimensions of rms into the talent of agents.
Our results on the assignment function here naturally provide a theory for the aforementioned empirical work on sorting in this labor market that will generate sharper tests of the importance of sorting.
We also derive a new asset pricing test of the inuence of labor market sorting on the informational eciency of the rm. Under a null where the rm's level informational eciency is not endogenous, we expect that the expected return of a stock to increase with rm scale and rm opacity. But if informational eciency is endogenous, then the relationships between expected return between rm scale and rm opacity are no longer monotonically increasing. There are two forces then that shape the cross-section of expected returns. The rst is the usual (exogenous) risk-sharing force whereby rms with higher scale and opacity required higher expected return. The other is an (endogenous) information eciency force whereby rms with higher scale and opacity can purchase coverage to improve their eciency.
In general, the shape between the cross-section of expected returns and these underlying parameters can be non-monotonic, depending on the strength of the relative strength of these two forces.
In other words, the assignment function is an omitted variable in determining the crosssection of expected returns. When we control for this omitted variable, we can then decompose these two forces. The model oers a very simple functional form to take to the data.
Using a rst-stage assignment function along the lines of Akkus et al. (2013) , we can test this asset pricing prediction. This is a test of the endogeneity of assignment and of the value matching function o being driven by a noisy rational-expectations equilibrium.
Importantly, we also prove that if there is a scarcity of talent to evaluate rms, the endogenous information eciency dominates, leading to a atter relationship between expected return with rm size and opacity. Since we have a static model, our scarcity of talent prediction can be interpreted as the exogenous arrival of new initial public oering (IPO) or technologies that only some of the existing analysts in the labor market can accurately decipher. As such, it is easy to look to time series variation in IPO waves and test if our predictions are true.
Second, we show this competitive-sorting eect is captured by the steepness of the wage distribution. The wage of an agent is rising in his talent. The stronger is our competitivesorting eect, the steeper the wage prole is with talent.
8 As a result, the strength of the complementarity depends on external factors such as the amount of market noise and the extent of the precision that the market has about rm prots. We expect compensation to be more skewed when there is more market noise or less market precision.
Consistent with this prediction, the compensation of the top analysts are highly skewed.
During the Internet Bubble Period of 1997-2000, security analysts' pay were especially skewed as the prices of dot-com stocks were noisy and underlying dot-com pay-os were also highly uncertain, consistent with our model's prediction. Third, we show that sorting can oer a satisfying explanation of the neglected rm eect. 10 The traditional explanation of why some rms have no coverage and suer from low prices as a result requires that there be high xed cost (see, e.g., Merton (1987) ). But we show that the neglect eect is magnied by the labor market matching eect. That is, we can get a neglect eect even at low xed cost. When there are xed costs to covering a rm, rms below a certain cut-o (depending on scale and opacity) do not pay for coverage since they do not benet as much as other rms. Less informationally opaque rms are only able to compete for and hire low precision agents since the high precision ones work for higher opacity rms and get paid more. This is a dierent take on the traditional interpretation of the neglect eect in the literature. We show that, absent this labor market matching eect, the cut-o rm opacity below which there would be no coverage is larger.
We have emphasized the labor market for underwriter/analysts when rms go public. But rms can have other motives for wanting their stock prices to be informationally ecient as we alluded above, including using informative stock prices to alleviate moral hazard (Holmström and Tirole (1993) ) and making wise capital investments (Chen et al. (2007) , Bai et al. (2013) )) even in the absence of a need for external capital. As a result, it is not surprising that more mature rms hire media or investor relations professionals to improve their disclosures.
Our model is similar to voluntary disclosure models (see, e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia 9 Susan Craig, "Star Analysts Are Back (No Autographs, Please), August 20, 2011, NYTIMES DealBook 10 The earliest study on the neglected rm eect by Arbel et al. (1983) nds that stocks with zero or low analyst coverage out-perform stocks with high analyst coverage. Subsequent studies such as Foerster and Karolyi (1999) used quasi-experiments to establish the importance of coverage or investor recognition in explaining the neglect eect. Recently, Tetlock (2007) and Fang and Peress (2009) nd that stocks with more media coverage have lower expected returns.
(1991), Fishman and Hagerty (1989) , Admati and Peiderer (2000) ). Firms might precommit to disclosing a public signal of their earnings to improve the price eciency and risk discount for their shares. Results depend on the nature of the cost of disclosure, which is exogenously given and requires convexity in the cost structure. The costs in our model are determined by the entire stock market via labor market sorting and wages.
We show in the extension section that we can model the value of matching in this labor market using Holmström and Tirole (1993) , whereby the rm derives benets from better contracting with employees. Our model can be applied to savvy media or investor relations professionals who help the rm improve disclosure (Bushee and Miller (2012) , Karolyi and Liao (2015) ). Indeed, Karolyi and Liao (2015) nd also substantial wage dispersion for investor relations professionals, consistent with such a matching model. The model lasts for three dates. There is a continuum of heterogeneous rms who issue equity through stock markets with measure one. Specically, a rm originally owns (1 + ψ) measure of shares and wants to raise capital by issuing one measure of their equity to investors. There is a distribution of agents with measure one, denoted by
who dier in terms of skill (i.e., the precision of information they can produce). The quality of information for each rm's prots thus depends on which agent a rm hires. At date 0, the allocation of agents across rms and agents' fees are pinned down in a competitive assignment equilibrium. At date 1, agents produce information, and trade takes place in the stock markets. Finally, at date 2, the cash ow is realized, and all agents consume their realized gains.
Firm: Firms seek to maximize mean share price at t = 1. A rm's capital stock is denoted by k and each rm owns a risky project with volatility σ θ . The payo of the project for the rm with capital k, is given by kθ, where θ is a rm-specic payo drawn from a Normal distribution with meanθ and variance σ 2 θ . We assume that the fundamental payos are uncorrelated across rms.
We assume that there is a segmented capital market for each rm in the spirit of Merton (1987) . In each market, there is a unit measure of a continuum of risk-averse investors. They have CARA expected utility with coecient of risk aversion γ I . Investors are imperfectly and heterogeneously informed. Specically, each investor receives a private signal For simplicity, we assume that each investor only has access to one market, and each investor can submit their demand based on their information set. There are also noise traders in each market. To solve the model in closed form, we assume that noise traders purchase a random quantity Φ(ũ) of stock, whereũ ∼ N (0, σ u ) and Φ is the standard normal CDF. This specic functional form assumed here is close to that in Hellwig et al. (2006) .
We allow rms to dier in multiple characteristics, where y = (σ θ , σ x , σ u , k, ψ, γ I ) ∈ Y ⊆ R 6 + represent rm types. That is, rms can dier in their project risks (σ θ ), clientele (captured by precision σ x and risk aversion γ I of their investors), market condition (captured by market noise σ u ), capital size (k) and the proportion of issued shares 1 1+ψ
. The types of rms are distributed according to a probability measure ν F on Y, which is assumed to be absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure.
Agent: When the agent h ∈ H works for the rm y, he can produce a report z at cost C at date 1. Coverage, or the report, is a noisy, unbiased signal regarding the payo:
where η ∼ N (0, 1), and the variance of the report is parameter as
Higher values of h denote more precise agents.
Labor Market for Agents (t = 0): At date 0, each rm can at most hire one agent to cover the rm assuming the rm hires any at all. The fee paid to the agent is denoted by ω(h). That is, the fee is independent of the signal and realized payo. 12 The fee ω(h) will be determined in equilibrium. The payo of agent h is then given by ω(h) − C. It is assumed the rm is be able to pre-commit to the hiring decision. The end-of-period cash ows for rm y is then the prot from its project minus the fee that the rm commits to pay:
At date 0, given the fee required to hire agent ω(h), a rm of type y, rationally anticipating how dierent agents aect the stock price at date 1, chooses the optimal agent to maximize the rm's expected payo,
wherep hy denotes the realized share price at date 1 for rm y if it hires agent h. That is, a rm eectively maximizes its expected share price. In a noisy rational expectations stock market equilibrium, the realized price will be a function of the fundamental θ, public signal z, and the demand of noise tradersũ. That is,p hy = P (θ, z, u|h, y).
Financial Market for Stocks (t = 1): All investors observe the public signal z produced by the agent and know its precision. Each can purchase at most one share for each stock or none at all based on their information set. That is, they submit a price-contingent demand schedule for stock y, which species their demand d i (p) ∈ {0, 1} conditional on price p to solve:
These bid functions determine the aggregate demand by informed investors. We maintain the restriction on demand for tractability. Alternatively, one can allow investors to submit a bidding schedule d i (p) ∈ R, which will not change the key economic results. 13 Together with the demand from the noisy traders, the auctioneer selects a price P to clear the market.
Equilibrium Denition: An equilibrium consists of an assignment µ(y): Y → H ∪ {∅}, competitive fee for agents ω(h) : H → R + , demand function for each investor in the mar-
, and a price function P (θ, z, u|h, y) such that the following three conditions are met.
First, in the labor market for agents, the optimality conditions for both rms and agents are satised, which means that, given the wage ω(h), µ(y) is the type of agent that rm y optimally chooses to hire. That is, µ(y) maximizes (1). Second, in each market (h, y), investors choose their demand schedules to maximize (2). Third and lastly, the marketclearing condition holds for both the labor and asset markets.
Equilibrium
We rst analyze the surplus generated by agent h for rm y, taking into account how the produced information aects the price movement in the stock market at t = 0. With this surplus function, we then analyze the matching of agents and rms in the labor market.
Financial Markets
When rm y hires agent h, investors thus obtain a public signal with precision h =
Aggregating the demand decisions of all investors in market (h, y), market clearing then
From the investor's optimization problem (2),
, 1} can be characterized by a cuto, such that D(x i , z, p|h, y) = 1 if and only if x i >x(z, p).
Recall that each investor receives a private signal x i = θ + σ x i , where i ∼ N (0, 1). This cut-o equilibrium then implies that only investors with good signals will buy, i.e. those investors with
With our specications, the market-clearing condition can then be conveniently rewritten as
For the market to clear,x
Hence, observing price in our model is informationally equivalent to a public signal (i.e. this cut-o valuex) with the precision
14 An investor's information set can be summarized
. Thus, the conditional expectation of the fundamental is then given by
For the cut-o investorx, the price must be equalized to the payo of holding one share.
Hence,
Notice that since investors rationally take into account the fee expense, a higher fee thus decreases the price, which shows up in the rst term of Equation (6). The second term represents the risk premium for rm y that hires analyst h, which has the following
where τ (y) is an one-dimensional transparency index that summarizes the information characteristic of rm:
And, κ(y) is the scale index of a rm y :
Lemma 1 summarizes the properties of the risk premium.
14 In general, as shown in Albagli et al. (2011) , there exists a random variable that is only a function of θ andũ, and contains the same information as the price. Lemma 1. The risk premium for rm y that hires analyst h is given by Equation (7), which strictly decreases with the precision of the agent h and strictly increases with rm volatility σ θ , market noise σ u , investor's noise σ x , risk aversion γ I , rm size k, and the proportion of issued shares 1 1+ψ
. That is, a higher level of precision h decreases the risk premium charged by investors, since it improves investor's estimation of the fundamental pay-o. Firms with higher volatility and with a noisier capital market have lower transparency index. All things being equal, the risk premium is then higher for less transparent rms, since the investors have to bear more risk for those rms. Similarly, the risk premium is higher for rms with a larger scale.
But not all things will be equal in equilibrium, as rms with dierent characteristics have varying incentives or purchase varying degrees of accurate coverage, or even none at all.
Matching in The Labor Market
Taking into account how the agent aects the price in the asset market, the allocation of agents across rms can be solved as a matching problem. As is well-known in a matching model, the allocation depends on the property of the matching surplus of rm and agent. In our model, this surplus is driven by the coverage eect in nancial markets. Specically, the rm's expected utility when hiring agent h can be conveniently rewritten as the expected payo of the project minus the risk premium and the agent fee:
Despite that the rm only pays some portion of the fees at the end of period (i.e.,
the reduction in asset price due to the hiring is
. Hence, from a rm's view point, the total cost is simply the agent fee. As a result, the surplus between rm with y and agent h, which is the sum of their payo minus their outside option, yields
where ∅ denotes the case in which a rm hires no agent (i.e., the rm's autarky value) and the worker's unemployed value is normalized to zero. The rst term thus represents the gain of rm y when he hires agent h relatively to no hiring. The second term represents the payo of a worker, which is the fee minus the production cost. Hence, the surplus is simply the value of coverage, which is the reduction in risk premium (relative to no hiring), minus the cost of producing information.
Technically, given multiple characteristics of a rm, our environment is a multidimensionalto-one matching problem. Chiappori et al. (2016) has established regularity conditions under which a stable matching exists and the assignment function µ(y) is pure and unique. Given our surplus function in (9) and the measure of rms ν F is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, we show that these conditions are indeed satised and extend their results to the environment where some agents remain unmatched. Proposition 1. There exists a unique equilibrium {µ(y), ω(h)}. The market price for rm y is characterized by Equation (6), setting (h, y) = (µ(y), y), and the demand function for rm y is given by D(x i , z, p|µ(y), y).
Despite rms diering in multiple characteristics, from the surplus function, one can see that the characteristics of rms can be simply reduced to two aggregated indices: a transparency index τ (y) and a scale index κ(y), thereby simplifying our characterization.
With a slight abuse of notation, we now denote the assignment function as a function of these two indices directly. That is, the agent hired by rm y is denoted by µ(κ(y), τ (y)).
Proposition 2 rst establishes the property of the assignment function as a function of these two indices directly.
Proposition 2.
(1) Conditional on rms with the same scale index κ(y ) = κ(y), rm y hires a more precise agent than rm y if and only if rm y has a lower transparency index:
(2) Conditional on rms with the same transparncy index τ (y ) = τ (y), rm y hires a more precise agent than rm y if and only if rm y has a higher scale index:
These results can be seen easily from the rms' optimization problem. Specically, given that all rms facing the same cost function ω(h), a rm that has a higher marginal benet of increasing precision must hire a more precise agent in equilibrium. From Equation (8), one can see that the marginal value of more precise information is given by
In other words, there is a complementarity between the precision of an agent and rms' scale and the transparency of the rm's endowed informational environment before hiring from the labor market. The intuition is very simple: xing the scale of a rm, when investors' estimation of rm cashow is less precise (i.e. a lower τ (y)), any increase in the precision of public information improves their estimation more substantially. A lower transparency index can be driven by a more risky project (a higher σ θ ) or a less informative capital market (a higher level of investors' noise σ x or market noise σ u ). On the other hand, if any of the variances converges to zero, τ (y) → ∞, and the marginal value of public information thus goes to zero. Hence, xing the scale of a rm, there is a negative sorting between agent precision and the rm transparency. That is, a more opaque rm must hire a more precise agent.
Similarly, since rms with a higher scale κ(y) have more risk that the investors have to bear, a better investor estimation reduces the risk premium more substantially. Thus, xing the transparency, there is a positive sorting between agent precision and rm scale.
Proposition 3.
(1) The assignment function µ(κ, τ ) must satisfy the following partial differential equation:
(2) There exists a cuto of agent h * ≥ h L such that are agents actively matched if and
The cuto type h * must satisfy the following
, where Y 0 denote the set of rms who are not matched (i.e.
To see this, for all rms with index (κ, τ ) :
Assuming double dierentiability of U * , we thus have
, which gives the expression in Equation (11).
Without any xed cost (i.e., C = 0), the surplus is positive for all agents and thus all should be matched. On other hand, given any positive xed cost C > 0, agents with lower precision may not be hired since he cannot generate enough value to compensate the xed cost.
Given that Ω(y, h) increases with precision, the surplus function is then positive if and only if the precision of an agent above a cuto valueĥ(κ, τ ), which is the precision that
solves Ω(y, h) = 0. Moreover, all rms essentially compete for the more precise agents. This thus explains (1) the cuto rule: if a less precise agent is hired in equilibrium, then a more precise agent must be hired as well; (2) the agent fee increases with precision ω h (h) > 0.
Generally, the assignment function must satisfy Equation (11) and together with the restriction on the market-clearing condition. As discussed in Chiappori et al. (2016) , when type spaces are multidimensional, it is generally not possible to derive a closed form solution for the assignment function. We now consider the following nested environment that allows for a full characterization. Most of our results below do not require a nested environment but some of the wage distribution implications do. This nested environment is empirically plausible, however, as we explain below. It also oers the reader an illustration of the matching patterns and deeper insight into the assignment solution.
Full Characterization under Nested Matching
Facing the equilibrium fee ω(h), ω h (h) represents the marginal cost of a particular precision from the view point of rms. From the rst order condition, if a rm y chooses to match with an agent µ(y) in equilibrium, then his marginal benet of precision must equal the marginal cost. That is, Ω h (y, µ(y)) = ω h (µ(y)).
In other words, once we have gured out the value of ω h (h), one can then nd out the set of rms that are matched to agent h. Note that when rms dier in both indices, two dierent types of rms may have the same marginal value of h. To facilitate the analysis, dene the set of rms y whose marginal benet of precision h is given by a value of m :
That is, if the marginal cost of hiring agent h is given by ω h (h), then Υ(h, ω h (h)) is the set of rms that are matched to agent h.
Clearly, ω h (h) is an equilibrium object, which depends on the underlying distribution.
We now consider the following algorithm that allows us to construct an explicit solution for this multi-dimensional environment. For simplicity, we assume C = 0 throughout this section; nevertheless, similar characterization can be obtained for C > 0. The basic idea of the equilibrium construction is the following.
First, for each h, we will need to choose some level m ∈ R that satises the following condition:
That is, by choosing m properly for each agent h, the measure of rms whose marginal benet of h is lower than m, denoted by Y (h, m) ≡ {y ∈ Y | Ω h (y, h) ≤ m}, exactly coincides with the measure of agents below h.
Second, set ω h (h) = m and assign agent h to the set of rms in Υ(h, ω h (h)). That is,
. Figure 1 illustrates the construction above. For each value of h, the set of rms whose marginal value of h is m (i.e. Y (h, m)) can be represented by a quadratic relationship between κ and τ : κ = m(τ + h) 2 , as the marginal value is given by
. Firms below this curve thus constitute the set of rms whose marginal benet of precision is lower than m. Intuitively, if m were the price for precision h, all rms below (above) the line nd this type of agent too expensive (cheap).
Choosing m for each h is thus as if we are choosing the price for any given precision. Equation (12) requires that, in equilibrium, the price for any particular precision must be chosen in a way so that the measure of rms that nd this type of agent too expensive exactly coincides the measure of agents that are below this agent.
By setting m = ω h (h), it is only optimal for rms in the set Υ(h, ω h (h)) to match with agent h. The set of rms who are matched to h is illustrated in Figure 1 , where each line is given by κ = ω h (h)(τ + h)
2 and ω h (h) is chosen so that Equation (12) is satised. Figure 1 : Figure 1 illustrates the set of rms who hires agent with precision h, where
and ω h (h) is chosen so that the measure of rms below the line coincides with G A (h).
As established in Chiappori et al. (2015) , this algorithm works only in the environment where the constructed ω h (h) in the above procedure satises the following nested condition:
That is, the construction of fee schedule is such that if a rm nds hiring an agent h is too expensive, then he must nd a more precise agent h > h too expensive as well. In other words, the constructed indierence set in Figure 1 never intersect.
Observe that Condition (13) together with Condition (12) guarantee that (1) the set of rms who found h are too expensive are always matched to rms below agent h and (2) market clears in the sense that the measure of these rms who hire agents below h coincides with the measure of agents below h. As a result, the optimality condition of rms and market-clearing condition are satised. Proposition 4 summarizes the characterization.
Proposition 4. Let ω h (h) be the value that solves Y (h, ω h (h)) = G A (h). Under nested matching (i.e., if condition (13) holds), the optimal assignment is characterized by µ
As discussed in Chiappori et al. (2015) , whether condition (13) actually holds generally depends on the underlying measure of agents and rms. Chiappori et al. (2015) further provides criteria for this condition to hold and establishes that it is always possible to nd such a underlying distribution that satises this condition. Note that, in our environment, if the constructed ω(h) is convex, then condition (13) must hold. That is, if a rm y = (κ , τ )
Hence, whenever the underlying distribution leads to a convex ω(h), we know immediately that the above procedure indeed characterizes the stable matching.
Firms with Homogeneous Scales We now look at the case when rms have the same κ(y) = κ ∀y but with dierent cash ow volatility (σ θ ), dierent clientele (captured by investor's precision σ x ), and dierent market noise (σ u ). As discussed below, this is in fact a special case where condition (13) holds for any distribution.
Since the types for rm can be summarized by an one-dimensional transparency index τ (y), the model then simply collapses to the standard model with one-dimensional heterogeneity. Let G F (τ ) denote the measure of rms that has a transparency index lower than τ :
Specically, since a more opaque rm (i.e., with a lower transparency index) have higher marginal value of precision, such a rm must hire a more precise agent.
According to Equation (12), ω h (h) is then simply the marginal value of precision h for rmsτ , where the measure of rms above rmτ (i.e., those who found h are too expensive) coincides with the measure of agent below h. That is, µ
Since a more precise agent is matched to a more opaque rm (i.e. µ −1 (h) > µ −1 (h ) for h > h), one can show that condition (13) is always satised. Formally,
Hence, the wage prole and assignment function can be simply characterized by the following equations:
µ −1
As standard in the one-dimensional matching model, Equation (14) shows that the marginal increase in the fee of agent h is his contribution to the surplus Ω h (µ −1 (h), h) within the match, given his optimal assignment µ −1 (h). For all agents that are actively matched, Equation (15) can be derived directly from the familiar market-clearing condition:
As discussed above, condition (12) in two-dimensional case is in fact equivalent to this market-clearing condition in the one-dimensional case.
Implications
We now establish empirical implications for cross-sectional variation in coverage and asset returns, as well as agent wages.
Asset Pricing Test of Endogenous Information Eciency and Labor Market Sorting
We examine how the cross-sectional variation in coverage aects the expected return across rms. Given any price p, the asset return is given by E[π y − p|p]. The (unconditional) expected asset return for rm y is then given by
.
If coverage were homogeneous across rms, one would expect that the risk premium must increase with the scale and decrease with transparency of the rm. This is, however, no longer true when the quality of coverage is endogenous. To see this formally, the change in the risk premium respect to transparency and scale of a rm is given by:
Comparison to No-Sorting benchmark As expected, if all rms hire the same agent (µ τ = 0 and µ κ = 0) , the risk premium must increase with the scale and decrease with transparency:
∂R(y) ∂τ < 0 and ∂R(y) ∂κ > 0. However, according to Proposition 2, the sorting generates an opposite force: the more opaque and/or the larger rm hires a more precise agent in equilibrium (i.e. µ τ < 0 and µ κ > 0), which in turns decreases the risk premium.
To highlight the sorting eect, we further consider a counterfactual environment where agents and rms are matched randomly. That is, the type of agent hired by each rm is randomly drawn from the distribution G A (h). In this case, a rm y will hire an analyst h as long as the surplus Ω(y, h) is positive (i.e., when h ≥ĥ(κ, τ )). Hence, under random matching, the average expected return for rm y conditional on having coverage is then given by
Since the less transparent and/or the larger rm are less selective, the average coverage quality in fact decreases with the scale and increase with transparency: µ RM κ (κ, τ ) < 0 and
Hence, under random matching, the risk premium always increases with scale and decreases with transparency, which is in sharp contrast to the sorting model.
As established in Proposition 5, only the coverage pattern under sorting can overturn the standard opacity and size prediction on expected return.
Proposition 5. (Coverage Eect and Non-Monotonic Returns)
The expected returns can be non-monotonic in transparency and scale as a result of the coverage eect under competitive sorting. In contrast, under no-sorting benchmark, the expected returns must increase with scale and decrease with transparency. The magnitude of the coverage eect The strength of this coverage eectcaptured by µ τ and µ κ moreover, endogenously depends on the underlying distribution of rms and agents (i.e., the competition). To see this clearly, rst consider the simple case where rms have homogeneous scales. In this case, the change in the precision as a function of rm's transparency is characterized by Equation (15), which shows explicitly how the underlying distribution aects the the magnitude of the coverage eect. Without loss of generality,
One can then clearly see that the strength of this coverage eect increases with dispersion of agents' talents. That is, Equation (15) can be rewritten as:
When rms dier in both indices, the assignment function does not have a simple analytical expression. Nevertheless, same intuition holds. The more dispersed talents simply suggest that it generates a large cross-sectional dierence in the coverage, which thus lead to higher slope of µ τ and µ κ and to Proposition 6:
Under nested matching, a higher dispersion of talents leads to a stronger endogenous coverage eect (i.e., a steeper µ τ and µ κ ) Discussion on Empirical Tests From these propositions, we can derive the following simple set of equations to take to the data:
Note that if there is no sorting, µ k = µ τ = 0, we get that the log of expected return of a rm rises with the log scale k and decreases with log transparency τ (this is the risk-sharing force). Empirically, since there is measurement error, we might not get exactly coecients of one but expect something close. But if there is sorting (µ k and µ τ are non-zero), it is easy to see from these equations that these relationships need not be monotonic anymore and can actually be highly non-monotonic as we described in the 3-D plots above, depending on the strength of the sorting or the endogenous information eciency eect.
One way to test these equations structurally is to using a rst-stage assignment function along the lines of Akkus et al. (2013) . We can test these asset pricing predictions. This is a test of the endogeneity of assignment and of the value matching function o being driven by a noisy rational-expectations equilibrium. We expect the coecients in front of log size and transparency to be steeper once we control for the assignment function.
Another way to test our model is to use Proposition 6. Our scarcity of talent prediction can be interpreted as the exogenous arrival of new initial public oering (IPO) or technologies that only some of the existing analysts in the labor market can accurately decipher. As such, it is easy to look to time series variation in IPO waves and test if our predictions are true.
All else equal, we expect the coecients in front of log size and transparency to be atter when there is an IPO wave.
Wage Dispersion and Superstar Eect
We now establish empirical implications for agent wages. Clearly, the wage of an agent is rising in his talent (i.e., precision). The slope of the wage prole thus represents the return of talent. As in the CEO literature (see, e.g., Terviö (2008) ; Gabaix and Landier (2008) ), a higher return of talent can thus be interpreted as a stronger superstar eect. We now establish how such an eect depends the underlying parameters, linking our predictions to the rise of superstar eect among securities analysts.
Recall that in equilibrium, rms choose agent h if and only if their marginal value precision of h is equal to marginal cost ω h (h). In other words, the marginal increase in the fee of agent h is then his contribution to the surplus within the match:
where µ −1 (h) is the set of rms that are matched to agent h. Since the sorting predicts that a more precise agent is matched to a rm who has a higher value of precision (i.e., either a larger or more opaque rm), it thus further amplies the superstar eect.
Comparison to No-Sorting Benchmark To see how sorting amplies the superstar eect formally, we again compare to the environment under random matching. Notice that, in our model, the wage of an analyst is pinned down competitively by his next best competitor so that it is optimal for each rm to hire their optimal agent. Such a mechanism is absent in the random matching setting. Thus, following the standard random matching setup, we assume that the wage is determined by Nash Bargaining, which yields
where β is the (exogenous) bargain power of workers. For simplicity, assume that the surplus is positive for all pairs, the average wage for agent h under random matching is then given by ω RM (h) ≡´Y ω RM (y, h)dν F , and its slope is given by:
That is, the slope is given by the average marginal value of precision across all rms. Since the marginal value of precision is decreasing in h, Equation (20) thus implies that that the wage must be concave in talent under random matching: ω RM hh (h) < 0. Clearly, in both cases, a more precise analyst receives a higher wage due to a higher ability. However, Equation (20) shows how the prediction on the slope diers across two settings: the marginal value for a more precise agent is given by his added value at a larger or more opaque rm in the sorting environment, instead of an average value across all rms under random matching.
This thus suggests that the slope of wage prole for agents at the top is much higher in the sorting framework than the one under random matching. In contrast, the slope of wage prole for agents at the bottom is much lower in the sorting framework, as such agents can only match to rms with lower marginal value. Thus, sorting amplies the superstar eect in the sense that it increases the return of talent for agents with higher precision but decreases the return of agents with lower precision.
The Steepness of Wage Prole We now establish that, under nested matching, how the return of talent depends the underlying parameters. Recall that the value of ω h (h) is given by m that solves Equation (12). That is, among agents that are actively matched,
Equation (21) clearly shows that, given any agent h, when there are more agents below him (i.e., less talents below h), the value of m that clears the market must increase, which thus implies the wage becomes steeper for agent h. In contrast, this force is again absent under random matching. This can be seen clearly from Equation (19),
Proposition 7. Consider two talent distributions G A 1 (h) and G A 2 (h) with the same range and assuming nested matching, if
That is, the slope of wage prole ω h (h) is higher when talents are scarce.
We now turn to analyze how the wage depends on the distribution of rms. Consider the case when all rms become larger or more opaque. That is,κ = λκ and/or τ = τ λ for all rms for some constant λ ≥ 1.
Proposition 8. Under nested matching, the slope of wage prole ω h (h) increases when all rms have larger scale or become more opaque.
Intuitively, the marginal value of precision is now higher. One would then expect a higher return of talent. Moreover, since sorting leads to a stronger superstar eect compared to random matching, one can easily see that such an eect is further amplied. That is, for example, when rms are multiplied by a constant λ, the dierence in the slope ω h (h)−ω RM h (h) is then simply scaled up by λ.
Our result thus connects the superstar eect to underlying distribution of rms. During the Internet Bubble Period of 1997-2000, security analysts' pay were highly skewed as the prices of dot-com stocks were noisy and underlying dot-com payos were also highly uncertain. Top analysts such as Henry Blodgett and Mary Meeker had compensation in the millions of dollars per year similar to top investment bankers. After the dot-com bubble, it is generally thought that compensation was signicantly scaled back because of regulatory reforms such as Reg-FD which curtailed conicts of interests in the industry.
Our model predicts that, beyond regulatory pressures, this compensation is also fundamentally tied to the uncertainty in the stock market and the scarcity of talent. Indeed, during the Second Internet Boom of the mid-2000s, compensation for analysts have returned with again very skewed pay-os for the top analysts.
Through the lens of our model, one can thus interpret both the rst and the second internet boom are the periods where rms become more opaque. As discussed above, the competitive sorting environment can generate much higher wage dispersion and stronger superstar eect.
Coverage and Neglected Stocks
Due to the x cost of information production, one would expect that some rms are being neglected. As shown in Proposition 4, certain rms do not hire any agent in equilibrium µ(y) = ∅. In this section, we show that the competition (i.e., sorting) further amplies this neglected eect.
To measure the neglected eect, we look at the total measure of rms that are being neglected, which is given by ν F (Y 0 ). In other words, 1−ν F (Y 0 ) then represents the extensive margin of aggregate market coverage. In order to show how sorting amplies the neglected eect, we compare our results to a counterfactual environment in which all rms can choose to hire an average quality of agentsh =´hdG A (h). Let µ ns (y) ∈ {∅,h} denote whether a rm has an agent covering it in the no-sorting benchmark. The set of rms who receive zero coverage without sorting is denoted by
Proposition 9. (Results on the Measure of Neglected Firms)
There existsc > 0 and c > 0, sorting leads to a higher measure of neglected stocks:
The rst result establishes how the competition leads to more rms being neglected. The intuition is very simple. Firms that are smaller or more transparent are most selective in terms of their hiring. That is, recall that rm (κ, τ ) hires agent if and only if h ≥ĥ(κ, τ ).
Given the surplus function increases with scale and precision but decreases with transparency, smaller and more transparent rms thus have a higher threshold. However, the sorting suggests that these rms can only matched to agent with lower precision, since they could not compete with other rms. As a result, these rms rather being unmatched (i.e., neglected).
The condition on the production cost simply guarantees that the cost is not too high so that it is valuable to hire an average analyst (i.e., Ω(κ L , τ H ,h) ≥ 0 ) but it is also not too low so that the worst agent does not generate enough surplus to compensate the production
. Hence, within this parameter region, the neglected rm eect is purely driven by the sorting.
Extension
One Agent for Multiple Firms
We have so far considered a one-to-one matching environment, that is one agent can only be hired by one rm. The model, however, can be easily extended to the environment where an agent is allowed to work for N ≥ 1 rms instead. The parameter N thus captures the capacity constraint of the underwriter or analyst.
Intuitively, given that an agent can work for N rms, there are eectively more talent available from the viewpoint of the rms. That is, N eectively changes the talent distribution. Since all rms would prefer to hire a better agent, the market clearing condition under nested matching can then be rewritten as:
In words, left hand side represents the measure of rms whose marginal value of h is above m. Those rms must hire an agent above h. Since each agent above h can work for N rms, the measure of these rm must equal N (1 − G A (h)). If all rms hire an agent in equilibrium, then the cuto type h * N must be given by 1 = N (1 − G A (h * N )). In other words, the equilibrium is thus equivalent to the environment whereG
One can thus solve for ω(h) under the distributionG A (h) and the payo for all agents above h * is then given by N ω(h).
Moreover, observe from Equation 22, it shows that the solution of m (and thus ω h (h)) must decrease in N. The intuition is simple: as a result of competition, the return for talent becomes lower when there is more talent out there.
Contracting and Firm Demand for Information Eciency
Firms in our main model hire agents in order to reduce the cost of capital when going public.
Another possible reason for why rms care about market eciency is to use informative stock prices to alleviate moral hazard, as in Holmström and Tirole (1993) . We now consider this monitoring channel as an alternative way that an agent provides value to the rm, and analyze the sorting outcome in this environment.
For simplicity, we assume all investors are risk neutral instead (i.e., shutting down the risk premium channel in the main model) and all rms face a moral hazard problem. The rm is run by a risk neutral manager, who exerts eort at t = 0 that aects the nal output of the rm. The payo of rm is given by
where v is a rm-specic payo drawn from a Normal distribution with meanv and variance σ 2 , and e is the component of earning determined by managerial eort. Hence,θ =v +ē, whereē denote the manager's equilibrium eort.
Managers are paid at t = 1. In the spirit of Holmström and Tirole (1993) , we assume that the compensation of the manager (denoted by I) is based on a xed salary w 0 and can be contingent on the stock price at t = 1. That is,
where (w 0 , α) are chosen optimally by the insider, and P is the realized market price. For simplicity, we assume that insider pays the manager and agent out of his own pocket at t = 1, and thus the price of stock only depends on the nal payo. We further assume all investors are risk neutral. The price is then simply the expected payo. That is, the price expression can be obtained by settingθ =v +ē, whereē denote the manager's equilibrium eort:
θ . Given the compensation and eort level e, the utility of risk-neutral manager is then given by W (w 0 , α, e) = w 0 + αP (v + e, z,ũ|h, σ) − kc(e), where c(e) = 1 2 e 2 is the manager's eort cost.
Facing the agency problem of the manager, the insider is now choosing both the analyst h as well as the managerial contract (w 0 , α) optimally at t = 0. The payo of rm when hiring an agent h is given by
subject to manager's (1) the individual compatibility (IC) constraint: e ∈ arg max e E[W (w 0 , α, e)]
and (2) individual rationality (IR) constraint: E[W (w 0 , α, e)] ≥ 0. Similar our baseline model, the rm chooses an agent h optimally so as to solve the following problem: U * (y) = max h {J(y, h) − ω(h)}. Hence, the sorting pattern is determined by the complementarity of the payo function J(y, h). Since the manager is risk-neutral, the rm does not have incentive to pay the xed fee w 0 as it does not provide incentives for a manager to exert eort. That is, w 0 = 0 for the optimal contract.
One can show that the solution to problem (24) can be simply reduced to the following:
where
The function φ(y, h) can be interpreted as the cost of incentivizing eort. Such cost is lower if the market information is more precise (i.e., higher h and τ m ) and when the rm is more volatile (i.e., lower τ θ ). Intuitively, when rms are less volatile, investors put a higher weight on the priorθ = (v +ē) in equilibrium (as shown in Equation (23)) and thus the price responds less to the true state and thus harder to incentivize the manager.
Clearly, an more precise agent leads to a higher payo for rms, as it is easier to incentivize the manager. Formally,
Similar as before, the rm with a larger scale k or issue a higher share 1 1+ψ have a higher marginal value of precision. Furthermore, under certain parameters, one can show that J τmh < 0 and J τ θ h > 0. Intuitively, since the market condition τ m and the precision h are substitutes, the marginal value for h is thus lower for higher τ m . On the other hand, when rms are less volatile (i.e., high τ θ ), any additional precision is more valuable, as it reduces the cost more signicantly (i.e., 
Conclusion
We provide a theory of endogenous stock market eciency emphasizing the sorting or assignment of rms of heterogeneous characteristics in a variety of labor markets where agents generate a public signal about the rm's fundamental value, i.e. coverage, with heterogeneous precision. For instance, in a noisy rational-expectations stock market equilibrium when a rm is going public, we show that there is positive assortative matching. In general, rms with higher noise or scale index benet more and pay more for accurate coverage as it leads to greater price eciency and less risk discount. ∀ y, h), the surplus function satises the following condition: for any given y, D y Ω(y, h) = D y Ω(y, h ) for h = h , where D y denote the derivatives respect to the vector y. That is, for a xed rm y, dierent h implies dierent marginal surplus for y. Hence, Theorem 6 in Chiappori et al. (2015) guarantees that there is an unique stable matching outcome, and the assignment function µ(y) is pure. That is, a rm y chooses an unique agent h and never randomizes between dierent agents h.
We now consider the case for large information costs so that the information value does not worth the production cost for some matching pairs. Clearly, among the subset of agents that are actively matched, the surplus must be positive (i.e.,Ω(y, µ(y)) > 0), hence, for the same logic, the matching solution for these rms and agents must be unique and pure.
We now turn to the set of rms that are being neglected. Note that, for any given ω(h), rms' optimization problem can be rewritten as:
Hence, this shows that a rm either hires an agent h * (κ, τ ) or remain in autarky µ(y) = {∅}. Thus, µ(y) is pure and unique for all rms, including those who choose to be unmatched. Furthermore, given ω(h), the set of rms who are being neglected can be characterized as
Furthermore, since Ω(y, h * ) < 0 ∀y ∈ Y 0 and the surplus increases with precision, the surplus between neglected rms and agents below the cuto types must be negative as well (i.e., Ω(y, h) < 0∀h < h * ). This thus shows that it is indeed optimal for those rms to remain unmatched µ(y) = {∅}.
A.1.3. Proof for Proposition 2
Proof. Given that U h (κ, τ, h) increases with scale κ and decreases with transparency τ , by Milgrom and Segal (2002) , µ(κ, τ ), the solution to Equation (1), must increase with κ and decrease with τ. Since U h (κ, τ, h) = Ω h (κ, τ, h), this is equivalent to looking at the complementarity of the surplus function, as standard in the matching model.
A.1.4. Proof for Proposition 3
Proof.
(1) From Equation (8), the payo for rms with index (κ, τ ) yields:
The cross partial derivatives yields:
Assuming double dierentiability of U * , we thus have Ω κh (κ, τ, µ)
∂µ ∂κ , which gives the expression in Equation (11).
(2) We now show that an agent is actively matched i h ≥ h * . The cuto role can be proved by contradiction. Suppose there exists h 2 > h 1 such that agent h 2 is not matched but agent h 1 is actively matched with rm y . That is, µ −1 (h 2 ) = ∅ and µ −1 (h 1 ) = y ∈ Y . Given that agent h 1 is actively matched with rm y , the surplus must be postive: Ω(y , h 1 ) > 0.
Since the surplus increases with precision, the surplus between rm y and agent h 2 must be positive as well. Hence, there is a protable deviation for rm y by oering oer wage ω(h 1 ) to agent h 2 . Both rm y and worker h 2 are better o in this case: rm y is strictly better o since he receives better coverage by paying the same wage; while the agent h 2 now receive ω(h 1 ) − C, which must be (weakly) larger than zero (i.e., the aurtarky value). That is, the pair-wise stability condition is violated.
Furthermore, the utility of agent be expressed as
is the market cleaning condition. Since both rms and agents have the same measure, the measure of neglected rms and unemployed agents must be the same. We now establish condition (b): if h > h L (i.e., some agents are un-
We prove this by contradiction. Suppose that in equilibrium,
, h * ) > 0 and let y * denote a rm that is matched to agent h * . Then there exist a rm y such that κ(y ) = κ(y * ) − and τ (y ) = τ (y * ) + such that Ω(y , h * − ) > 0 for some , > 0. By Proposition 2, since this rm has a smaller scale and higher transparency, he must hire a lower agent than rm y * . However, since h * is the cuto type by denition, this rm must be inactive µ(y ) = {∅}. However, there then exists a protable deviation:
rm y can hire agent h * − by paying a wage C. In this case, an agent is indierent, while the rm is strictly better o:
The inequality follows from the fact that Ω(y , h * − ) > 0.
Lastly, since Ω(µ −1 (h * ), h * ) = 0, then the cuto type must earn zero (i.e., ω(h * ) = C).
Hence, for rms being neglected, it must be the case that they rather choose not to hire agent h * . That is,
This thus establishes that Ω(y, h * ) < 0 for for y ∈ Y 0 .
A.1.5. Proof for Proposition 4
Proof. By construction, Equation (12) and (13) guarantees the market clearing is satised:
the measure of agents below h is the same as the measure of rms that hire agents whose precision is lower than h. We now examine rms' optimality condition.
Recall thatΥ(h, ω h (h)) is the set of rms that are matched to agent h,
Since
, it thus shows that FOC of rms is satised as
We now show that µ(y) is indeed the maximum of U (y, h). Condition (13) suggests that,
. That is, the marginal cost of a hiring a better agent h is too high:
That is, U (y, h) decreases with h for h > µ(y). Similarly, hiring an agent with lower precision is too cheap:
And thus, U (y, h) increases with h for h < µ(y). Hence, the constructed µ(y) solves the rm's optimization problem.
A.1.6. Proof for Proposition 5 and 6
Proof. Letĥ(κ, τ ) denote the solution such that Ω(κ, τ, h) = 0. Since the surplus increases with scale κ and decreases with transparency τ, it must be the case thatĥ τ (κ, τ ) ≥ 0
andĥ κ (κ, τ ) ≤ 0. By Leibniz's rule, below shows that the expected return under random matching must increase in size and decrease in transparency.
The coverage eect dominates whenever ∂R(y) ∂τ ∝ {1 + µ τ (κ(y), τ (y))} > 0 ∂R(y) ∂κ ∝ {τ (y) + µ(y) − κµ κ (κ(y), τ (y))} < 0
In one-dimension case, we have µ τ (τ ) = −dG F (τ )(h U − h L ) and similarly, µ κ (κ) = dG F (κ)(h U − h L ). Hence, the larger the dispersion, the more likely that the coverage eect dominates. For two-dimensional case, under nested matching, dene A.1.7. Proof for Proposition 7
Proof. For any given h, recall that ω h (h) is the value of m that solves
Since RHS increases with m (recall that M m > 0), thus, a higher G A (h) implies that a higher
A.1.8. Proof for Proposition 8
Proof. One can easily see that, if all rms scales are multiplied by some constant λ. Then, the value of m that solves the equation below is simply also multiplied λ :
When all rms become more opaque, the marginal value increase for all h, hence, the value of m that solves the above equation must goes up as well. Hence, a higher ω h (h) ∀h.
A.1.9. Proof for Proposition 9
Proof. Assume that there exists y L such that κ(y L ) ≤ κ(y) and τ (y L ) ≥ τ (y) ∀y. That is, intuitively, y L is the rm that has the lowest marginal value of precision since he has smallest scale and highest transparency. Let c be the value of the information cost such that
, h L ) = 0 and letc be the value such that Ω(κ(y L ), τ (y L ),h) = 0. Hence, for any C ∈ (c,c), the surplus between y L and the lowest agent h L is negative:
0. By continuity, there exists a set of rm y = (κ, τ ) that are in the neighbourhoods of (κ(y L ), τ (y L )) such that Ω(κ, τ, h * (κ, τ )) < 0. Hence, ν F (Y 0 ) > 0. On the other hand, those rms will hire agenth since Ω(κ, τ,h) > Ω(κ(y L ), τ (y L ),h) = 0. Hence, for any C ∈ (c,c),
A.2. Derivation for Contracting Channel
Firms design the contract {α, e} to solve the following constrained optimization problem: 
Plugging in Equation (26) One can show that SOC is also satised, and thus the solution is given by e * (φ, ψ) = For both cases, when τ m + h is large enough compared to τ θ, the second eect dominates: − p j ). Hence, an investor then solves the following maximization problem:
Given that all assets and signals are uncorrelated, one can see that our result remains unchanged since the optimization for each asset can be solved separately.
